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through	African	Negotiations	on	
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Global	Health	
	
AMY	BARNES,	GARRETT	WALLACE	BROWN	&	SOPHIE	HARMAN	
	
	
Abstract	
This	article	examines	how	national	health	actors	 in	South	Africa,	Tanzania	and	
Zambia	 perceive	 the	 participatory	 quality	 of	 negotiation	 processes	 associated	
with	 the	 performance‐based	 funding	 mechanisms	 of	 the	 Global	 Fund	 to	 Fight	
AIDS,	 Tuberculosis	 and	 Malaria	 and	 the	 World	 Bank.	 Through	 analysis	 of	
qualitative	 fieldwork	 consisting	 of	 101	 interviews	within	 the	 case	 countries	 as	
well	 as	 in	 Geneva	 and	Washington	 DC,	 the	 research	 results	 show	 that	 African	
actors	 within	 national	 governments	 generally	 set	 and	 negotiate	 performance	
targets	 of	 performance‐based	 funding	 schemes.	 Nevertheless,	 the	 results	 also	
show	 that	 the	 quality	 of	 those	 negotiations	 with	 external	 funders	 were	
inconsistent,	 suggesting	 the	 existence	 of	 asymmetrical	 power	 and	 influence	 in	
relation	to	the	quality	of	those	negotiations.	This	raises	questions	about	the	level	
of	 power	 and	 influence	 being	 exerted	 by	 external	 funders	 and	 how	 much	
leverage	 African	 political	 actors	 have	 available	 to	 them	 within	 global	 health	
diplomacy.	It	also	provides	evidence	that	certain	key	aspects	of	these	negotiated	
processes	 are	 closed	 off	 from	 negotiation	 for	 African	 actors,	 therefore	
undermining	African	participation	in	significant	ways.		
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Introduction	
The	 term	 global	health	diplomacy	 (GHD)	 has	 become	 increasingly	 entrenched	
within	 the	 global	 health	 governance	 lexicon	 (Kickbusch	 &	 Kokeny,	 2013).	 An	
increasing	 number	 of	 official	 GHD	 strategies	 are	 being	 established	 within	
developed	 countries	 such	 as	 Japan	 (Abe,	 2013),	 France,	 Norway	 (OMD,	 2007)	
and	 the	 United	 States	 (Jaffe,	 2013);	 and	 in	 developing	 countries	 such	 as	
Indonesia	(Seiff,	2013),	South	Africa,	Senegal	and	Thailand	(OMD,	2007);	as	well	
as	 in	 regional	 organizations	 such	 as	 the	 Eastern,	 Central	 and	 Southern	 Africa	
Health	Community	(ECSA‐HC,	2014).	Although	GHD	has	recently	received	a	level	
of	 ideational	 popularity,	 the	 concept	 of	 health	 diplomacy	 itself	 remains	
underdeveloped.		
	
The	 definition	 of	 GHD	 remains	 varied	 with	 understandings	 ranging	 from	 “an	
emerging	 field	 that	 addresses	 the	 dual	 goals	 of	 improving	 global	 health	 and	
better	 international	 relations”	 (Adams,	 2008),	 to	 “processes	 by	 which	
governments,	multilateral	 and	civil	 society	actors	attempt	 to	position	health	 in	
foreign	policy	negotiations	and	to	create	new	forms	of	global	health	governance”	
(Labonte	&	Gagnon,	2010),	and	to	“multi‐level	negotiation	processes	that	shape	
and	manage	 the	global	health	policy	environment	 for	health”	 (Kickbusch	et	 al.,	
2007;	WHO,	 2014).	A	more	 encompassing	definition	 suggests	 that	GHD	 is	 “the	
policy‐shaping	 processes	 through	 which	 states,	 intergovernmental	
organizations,	and	non‐state	actors	negotiate	responses	to	health	challenges	or	
utilize	 health	 concepts	 or	 mechanisms	 in	 policy‐shaping	 and	 negotiation	
strategies	to	achieve	foreign	policy	goals	and	the	utilization	of	foreign	policy	to	
achieve	 health	 goals”	 (GHD.NET,	 2009).	 Although	 ‘negotiation	 processes’	 are	
highlighted	 as	 key	 to	 GHD,	 there	 remains	 limited	 research	 attempting	 to	 link	
directly	 descriptive	 accounts	 of	 diplomatic	 exchanges	 to	 better	 theoretical	 and	
conceptual	 explanations	 about	 the	 ways	 global	 health	 policy	 is	 negotiated	
(Blouin	 et	 al.,	 2012;	 Michaud	 &	 Kates,	 2013).	 In	 this	 regard,	 GHD	 denotes	
processes	 of	 negotiation	 that	 take	 place	multilaterally	 and	 bilaterally	 between	
countries,	 multisectorally	 between	 states,	 non‐state	 and	 international	
organizations,	 and	 non‐officially	 between	 stakeholders	 and	 institutional	
representatives	 (Katz	 et	 al.,	 2011).	 What	 is	 not	 always	 clear,	 however,	 is	 the	
quality	 of	 these	 negotiations	 and	 what	 it	 says	 about	 global	 health	 diplomacy	
more	broadly.	
	
Despite	 on‐going	 debates	 about	 the	 exact	 specificity	 of	 GHD,	 it	 is	 possible	 to	
locate	 two	common	properties	 associated	with	 the	 concept,	which	are	deemed	
essential	 to	 its	 core	 conceptual	 understanding.	 Literature	 surveys	 show	
agreement	 on	 the	 need	 to	 better	 map	 the	 formal	 spaces	 for	 diplomatic	
participation	(Katz	et	al.,	2011)	and	the	need	to	pinpoint	the	practiced	processes	
of	negotiation	operating	between	health	policymakers	 (Kickbusch	et	al.,	2013).	
In	other	words,	whatever	GHD	 is,	 its	 conceptualization	 involves	understanding	
the	 specified	 spaces	 for	 diplomatic	 activity	 and	 the	 negotiation	 practices	 that	
enable	 diplomatic	 agreement	 on	 health	 policy.	 By	 better	 understanding	 these	
operating	 conditions,	 it	 is	 then	 possible	 to	 pinpoint	 key	 substantive	 qualities	
inherent	 to	 these	 diplomacy	 processes	 and	 determine	 how	 these	 qualities	
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correspond	 to	 other	 explanatory	 or	 normative	 considerations	 of	 global	 health	
governance	more	broadly	(Berridge,	2005;	Kickbusch	et	al.,	2013).	
	
The	purpose	of	this	article	 is	to	investigate	how	national	health	actors	in	South	
Africa,	 Tanzania	 and	 Zambia	 negotiate	 the	 performance‐based	 funding	 (PBF)	
mechanisms	 associated	 with	 the	 Global	 Fund	 to	 Fight	 AIDS,	 Tuberculosis	 and	
Malaria	(GFATM)	and	the	World	Bank.	As	will	be	outlined	below,	by	negotiation	
we	mean	 the	 “process	of	exchange	between	two	or	more	 interested	parties	 for	
the	purpose	of	reaching	an	agreement	that	can	satisfy	various	interests	of	mutual	
concern”	 (Fisher	 et	 al.,	 1997).	 By	 using	 PBF	 as	 a	 lens	 to	 examine	 how	 actors	
engage	in	global	health	policy,	and	by	focusing	on	specific	country	contexts,	it	is	
possible	to	better	isolate	key	negotiation	processes	available	to	African	actors	as	
an	aspect	of	global	health	diplomacy.	PBF	is	important	as	a	thematic	case	study	
because	it	has	emerged	as	an	increasingly	omnipotent	policy	phenomenon	in	the	
governance	of	health	(Ireland	et	al.,	2011),	which	resonates	with	GHD	definitions	
that	emphasize	health	negotiations	and	the	need	to	better	understand	the	spaces	
and	 practices	 involved	 (PBF	 involves	 multilevel	 negotiations	 among	
policymakers	 at	 local,	 national,	 regional	 and	 global	 levels).	 Investigating	 the	
dynamics	 involved	 in	 PBF	 negotiations	 makes	 it	 possible	 to	 discern	 unique	
properties	 specific	 to	 the	 quality	of	 negotiated	 agreement	 as,	 for	 example,	 in	
terms	of	equitable	diplomatic	positioning	as	perceived	by	the	negotiating	agents	
themselves.		
	
In	 global	 health,	 PBF	 refers	 to	 the	 idea	 of	 transferring	 resources	 from	 funders	
(money,	material	goods)	on	condition	that	particular	actions	are	taken	and	that	
recipients	achieve	specific,	predefined	performance	targets	(Eldridge	&	Palmer,	
2009).	 With	 reference	 to	 the	 Paris	 Declaration	 on	 Aid	 Effectiveness	 (PDAE,	
2005),1	funding	agencies	such	as	the	World	Bank	and	GFATM	argue	that	PBF	will	
promote	 reform	 in	a	way	 that	 is	 ‘nationally	owned’	and	accountable	 (Witter	et	
al.,	2012),	because	performance	indicators	are	designed	by,	and	negotiated	with,	
national	 coordinating	 bodies	 that	 have	 set	 these	 targets	 for	 themselves.	
Nevertheless,	 there	 is	 no	 systematic	 research	 examining	 the	 quality	 of	 these	
negotiations	 and	 how	 final	 agreements	 represent	 African	 interests	 in	 overall	
health	diplomacy.	As	will	be	presented	below,	due	to	the	nature	of	World	Bank	
and	GFATM	PBF	mechanisms,	most	negotiations	 take	place	bilaterally	between	
the	funder	and	the	national	government/principal	recipients.	This	often	does	not	
involve	 regional	 actors	 and	 tends	 to	 exclude	 and/or	 undervalue	 many	 local	
stakeholders	(although	this	varies	 from	case	to	case	and	 is	determined	by	how	
stakeholders	are	included	in	national	decision‐making	processes)	(Barnes	et	al.,	
2015).	 Because	most	 negotiations	 about	 the	 final	make‐up	 of	 PBF	 agreements	
are	bilateral	(although	various	NGOs	can	act	as	brokers),	this	article	focuses	on	
processes	 of	 negotiating	 PBF	 mechanisms	 between	 external	 funders	 and	
																																																								
1	The	Paris	Declaration	(2005)	is	a	practical,	“action	guiding	roadmap”	to	improve	the	quality	and	
effectiveness	of	aid	for	development.	It	provides	a	series	of	measurement	and	monitoring	
commitments	to	help	ensure	that	donors	and	receipts	hold	each	other	to	account.	The	five	
guiding	pillars	of	the	declaration	are:	country	ownership,	alignment,	harmonization,	managing	
for	development	results	and	mutual	accountability.	
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national/principal	 recipients,	 leaving	 aside	 discussion	 of	 internal	 negotiating	
mechanisms	within	 state	 bodies/Country	 Coordination	Mechanisms	 (CCMs)	 or	
how	INGOs/NGOs	influence	these	processes.		
	
Through	this	examination	it	is	possible	to	conclude	that	although	some	phases	of	
the	 negotiation	 process	 display	 conditions	 of	 equitable	 consonance	 between	
stakeholders	 in	 terms	 of	 recognized	 health	 priorities	 and	 the	 importance	 of	
cooperative	health	 initiatives,	 the	negotiations	themselves	often	operate	within	
frameworks	that	 limit	African	negotiations	 in	profound	ways.	As	a	result,	 if	 the	
substantive	quality	of	global	health	diplomacy	 is	 to	be	 judged	on	the	perceived	
quality	 of	mutually	 consistent	 negotiations	 and	 outcomes	 (Drager	 et	 al.,	 2000;	
Raiffa,	2007),	then	the	evidence	suggests	that	current	practice	of	PBF	modalities	
is	 often	 in	 tension	 with	 more	 idealized	 GHD	 understandings	 of	 mutually	
consistent	negotiation.	It	is	possible,	therefore,	to	locate	asymmetrical	influence	
and	 power	 that	 negatively	 affect	 diplomatic	 relations	 as	 they	 concern	 global	
health	financing.	
	
Methodology	
The	empirical	material	underpinning	this	article	is	from	fieldwork	conducted	as	
part	of	a	broader	research	program	of	the	Regional	Network	for	Equity	in	Health	
in	east	and	southern	Africa	(EQUINET)	supported	by	the	International	Research	
Development	Centre	(Canada)	on	global	health	diplomacy	 in	east	and	southern	
Africa.	The	research	took	place	between	October	2012	and	June	2013,	in	which	
101	 people	 participated	 in	 hour‐long	 semi‐structured	 interviews	 in	 Geneva,	
South	Africa,	Tanzania,	Washington	DC,	and	Zambia	(Barnes	et	al.,	2014	&	2015).	
South	Africa,	Tanzania	and	Zambia	were	selected	as	cases	because	they	exhibit	
essential	variables	for	comparison,	including:	1)	recent	or	ongoing	PBF	projects	
associated	with	the	World	Bank	and	GFATM;	2)	ongoing	PBF	negotiations	with	
the	World	Bank	and	GFATM;	and	3)	had	diplomatic	missions	in	Geneva	engaged	
in	negotiations	on	global	health	policy.	There	were	two	main	differences	deemed	
useful	for	cross‐country	comparison:	1)	the	percentage	of	overall	health	budget	
for	 each	 of	 the	 case	 studies	 was	 significantly	 different	 in	 terms	 of	 national	
reliance	 on	 external	 funding,	 allowing	 comparison	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 budgetary	
dependence	allowed	 for	better	or	worse	negotiating	position;	and	2)	each	case	
country	had	stated	different	forms	of	 ‘success’	 in	ongoing	negotiations	with	the	
World	Bank	and	Global	Fund.	In	all	cases,	the	self‐definition	of	success	in	terms	
of	 negotiated	 outcome	 suggested	 mixed	 perceptions	 of	 quality	 that	 provided	
illuminating	 insights	 on	 African	 diplomacy	 in	 terms	 of	 PBF	 programs	 and	 the	
policy	aims	of	GHD	more	broadly.	
	
To	capture	 individual	African	actors’	understanding	of	negotiated	PBF,	a	mixed	
qualitative	methodology	was	employed	to	ensure	that	the	theoretical,	historical	
and	empirical	aims	of	 the	research	were	 fully	met.	Secondary	sources	drew	on	
existing	academic	 literature	and	policy	documents	on	PBF	and	participation	 in	
global	 health	 and	 international	 development	 (Barnes	 et	 al.,	 2014).	 Primary	
research	was	 based	 on	 policy	 analysis,	 semi‐structured	 interviews,	 participant	
observation	and	stakeholder	analysis.	The	interviews	followed	a	thematic	guide	
that	 included:	 1)	 association	 with	 PBF	 and	 professional	 background;	 2)	
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understanding	 of	 PBF;	 3)	 knowledge	 of	 decision‐making	 and	 negotiation	
processes;	 4)	 influence	 on	 process;	 and	 5)	 contextual	 aspects	 of	 strategic	
planning,	 input	 and	outcomes	of	PBF.	The	 sample	 size	of	101	participants	was	
deemed	suitable	to	generate	significant	results	because:	1)	stakeholder	analysis	
located	 the	main	 actors	 involved	 in	 PBF	negotiation	 at	 the	 outset	 and	ongoing	
stakeholder	 analysis	 was	 allowed	 as	 processes	 of	 snowballing	 revealed	 new	
stakeholders	during	interviews;	2)	there	was	variation	in	the	elite	stakeholders	
interviewed,	 with	 interviews	 across	 the	 different	 sectors	 represented	
(government,	civil	society,	private	sector,	external	funders);	3)	the	data	became	
saturated	 (repetition	 of	 data	 across	 interviewees);	 and	 4)	 qualitative	
interviewing	 and	 analysis	 is	 well	 suited	 to	 capture	 subjective/intersubjective	
understandings	 as	 they	 relate	 to	 PBF	 and	 processes	 of	 negotiation.	 This	 is	
because	 qualitative	 semi‐structured	 interview	 techniques	 allow	 for	 greater	
investigation	 for	why	a	particular	 view	 is	 held	by	 an	 interviewee	 as	well	 as	 to	
allow	 follow‐up	 questions	 to	 uncover	 the	 underlying	 rationale	 for	why	 such	 a	
view	was	held.	
	
During	 the	 analysis	 phase,	main	 concepts	 and	 themes	were	 identified	 through	
familiarization	 with	 the	 interview	 material.	 Familiarization	 took	 place	 during	
interviews	and	by	 thoroughly	 reading	 through	 the	 transcripts.	Thus,	 there	was	
no	 clear‐cut	 border	 between	 the	 interview	 phase	 and	 the	 analysis	 phase.	 The	
floating	character	of	 this	analysis	allowed	the	researchers	to	better	understand	
the	subject	of	 inquiry,	which	related	to	perceptions	of	participation	 in	PBF	and	
the	perceived	quality	of	that	participation.	Further	analysis	of	the	research	data	
progressed	 in	 an	 iterative	 way	 using	 thematic	 analysis	 (sorting,	 labeling,	
summarizing	 data	 using	 predefined	 concepts	 such	 as	 understanding,	
assumptions,	 rationales	 and	 meanings),	 while	 also	 identifying	 new,	 emergent	
themes,	 detecting	 patterns	 and	 developing	 explanations	 to	 answer	 research	
questions.	The	analysis	below	represents	key	categorizations.	
	
Analytical	Framework	
The	original	EQUINET	Discussion	Paper	(Barnes	et	al.,	2014)	analyzed	the	data	
via	 the	 thematic	 analysis	 described	 above.	 In	 this	 article,	 we	 have	 extended	
analysis	 by	 employing	 Zartman	 and	 Berman’s	 (1982)	 negotiated	 agreement	
model	 as	 an	 analytical	 framework	 to	 catalogue	 and	 analyze	 the	 empirical	
material.	 This	 framework	was	 selected	 because	 of	 its	 wider	 recognition	 as	 an	
instrument	that	can	help	locate	and	classify	key	negotiation	spaces,	phases,	and	
internal	modes	of	operation	(Lewicki	et	al.,	2009).	Zartman	and	Berman	(1982)	
distinguish	 three	 phases	 of	 negotiation	 between	 interested	 parties	 to	 reach	
agreement.	 First,	 negotiations	 generally	 display	 a	 diagnostic	phase	 where	 key	
problems,	 issues	 and	 goals	 of	 mutual	 concern	 are	 identified,	 presented	 and	
prepared	 for	 deliberation.	 Second,	 negotiations	 also	 contain	 a	 formula	phase,	
where	 a	 shared,	 normative	 and	 deliberative	 framework	 is	 specified	 and	
delineated.	 Third,	 all	 negotiations	 go	 through	 a	 detailed	 phase	 of	 deliberation,	
contestation,	debate	and	exchange,	where	the	specific	terms	of	an	agreement	are	
enumerated,	 codified	 and	 accepted.	 In	 general,	 but	 not	 in	 all	 cases,	 successful	
diplomatic	 negotiations	 will	 result	 in	 agreement	 regarding	 three	 strategic	
factors:	1)	the	exact	specification	of	the	agents	who	are	bound	by	the	agreement;	
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2)	 the	 exact	 terms	 of	 agreement	 in	 relation	 to	 who	 has	 obligations	 and	 the	
expected	 delivery	 of	 those	 obligations;	 and	 3)	 exact	 enumeration	 of	 the	
agreement’s	 length	 or	 time	 limit.	 It	 is	 in	 this	 final	 negotiation	 phase	 where	
requirements/mechanisms	 regarding	 policy	 implementation,	 monitoring	 and	
arbitration	of	 future	disputes	are	 stipulated	and	defined.	Moreover,	 this	model	
was	selected	because	it	has	historical	application	in	relation	to	analyzing	global	
health	diplomacy	specifically	and	thus	has	a	level	of	acceptance	as	an	analytical	
heuristic	that	can	contextualize	negotiation	processes	(Lister	and	Lee,	2013).	
	
Although	Zartman	and	Barman	offer	 a	 useful	model	 for	 understanding	 various	
phases	 of	 negotiation,	 they	 do	 not	 provide	 criteria	 to	 determine	 the	 quality	 of	
negotiated	 agreements	 and/or	 the	 factors	 required	 to	 deliver	 long‐term	 and	
continued	 policy	 success.	 As	 suggested	 by	 Berridge	 (2005),	 ‘good’	 diplomacy	
involves	 the	 development	 of	 relationships	 and	 mutual	 understanding	 that	
provide	a	 context	 for	meaningful	 continuance	of	negotiations	 toward	 the	 long‐
term	 resolution	 of	 collective	 action	 problems.	 The	 negotiation	 criteria	 for	
developing	these	forms	of	‘mutually	consistent’,	long‐term	relationships	include	
enhancing	 perceptions	 of	 trust,	 creating	 clear	 processes	 for	 effective	
communication,	 generating	 perceived	 win‐win	 outcomes	 and	 assuring	 mutual	
agreement	via	consensus	(Raiffa,	2007;	Lister	&	Lee,	2013,	82).	In	addition,	it	is	
generally	 accepted	 that	 these	 conditions	 are	 significantly	 undermined	 by	
perceptions	 of	 force,	 coercion,	 asymmetric	 power,	 unclear	 decision‐making	
procedures,	 a	 lack	 of	 reason‐giving	 and	 limited	 or	 unidirectional	 arbitration	
mechanisms	and	accountability	chains	(Starkey	et	al.,	2010).	For	our	purposes,	if	
the	 ultimate	 aim	 of	 GHD	 is	 to	 “result	 in	 both	 better	 health	 security	 and	
population	 health	 outcomes	 for	 each	 of	 the	 countries	 involved	 as	 well	 as	
improving	the	relations	between	states	and	strengthening	the	commitment	of	a	
wide	range	of	actors”	(Kickbusch	et	al.,	2013,	4;	Drager,	2001),	then	the	aims	of	
GHD	 ultimately	 depend	 on	 the	 perceived	 quality	 of	 the	 health	 negotiations	
involved.	 As	 will	 be	 argued	 below	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 negotiation	 of	 PBF,	 the	
findings	 of	 this	 study	 suggest	 that	 current	 PBF	 modalities	 undermine	 these	
negotiation	 ideals	 and	 that	 problems	 of	 asymmetrical	 power	 and	 influence	
continue	 to	 significantly	 affect	 diplomatic	 relations	 as	 they	 concern	 African	
actors	and	global	health	financing.	
	
Results	and	Discussion	
As	 indicated	 above,	 Zartman	 and	 Berman	 (1982)	 distinguish	 three	 phases	 of	
negotiation	 between	 interested	 parties	 active	 in	 reaching	 agreement:	 a	
diagnostic	 phase,	 a	 formula	 phase	 and	 a	 negotiation	 phase.	 The	 case	 evidence	
suggests	 mixed	 perceptions	 about	 the	 quality	 of	 PBF	 negotiations	 across	 the	
three	phases,	which	provide	insights	on	African	diplomacy	in	terms	of	negotiated	
PBF	programs	and	how	the	quality	of	these	outcomes	are	often	asymmetrically	
skewed	by	power	and	influence.	
	
Diagnostic	Phase	
All	negotiating	parties	interviewed	(Tanzania,	Zambia,	South	Africa,	World	Bank	
and	 GFATM)	 broadly	 agreed	 on	 the	 general	 state	 of	 global	 health	 and	 the	
combined	 factors	 that	 are	 motivating	 the	 need	 for	 increased	 GHD	 and	 global	
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health	financing,	namely:	1)	the	disease	burden	in	Africa	represents	a	priority	for	
global	health	and	for	global	health	financing	in	particular;	2)	external	financing	is	
required	 and	 should	 be	 promoted	 through	 increased	 finance	 partnerships;	 3)	
external	 funders	 prefer	 PBF	 as	 the	 mechanism	 for	 delivering	 global	 health	
financing,	 and;	 4)	 global	 health	 targets,	 including	 those	 in	 the	 Millennium	
Development	 Goals	 (MDGs),	 inevitably	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 PBF	 target	
setting	between	external	funders	and	recipients.		
	
Although	the	results	above	raise	intriguing	questions	about	the	scale	and	depth	
of	norm	diffusion	between	negotiating	parties,	for	the	purposes	of	this	article,	it	is	
the	apparent	acceptance	of	PBF	as	a	preferred	modality	of	health	financing	that	
reveals	interesting	diagnostic	openings	and	closures	for	African	diplomats	within	
negotiation	 processes.	 In	 particular,	 in	 all	 cases	 examined,	 there	 is	 clear	
diagnostic	favouritism	for	PBF	modalities	by	funders	at	national	and	global	levels,	
and	 an	 acceptance	 that	 PBF	 is	 an	 effective	 funding	 mechanism	 for	 health	
systems,	despite	inadequate	evidence	to	support	this	view	(Emmert	et	al.,	2012;	
Eijkenaar	et	al.,	2013;	Eldridge	and	Palmer,	2009;	 Ireland	et	al.,	2011;	Magrath	
and	 Nicther,	 2012;	 Montagu	 and	 Yamey,	 2011;	 Scheffler,	 2010;	 Witter	 et	 al.,	
2012).	Within	 the	 interviews,	 it	was	 possible	 to	 locate	 four	 rationales	 seen	 as	
underwriting	 (rightly	 or	 wrongly)	 the	 current	 push	 for	 PBF	 in	 global	 health	
(Barnes,	et.	at.	2015).	First,	PBF	was	suggested	as	a	mechanism	to	better	monitor	
health	 interventions,	 thus	 providing	 more	 reliable	 information	 for	 increased	
evidence‐based	 policy.	 Second,	 there	 was	 belief	 that	 PBF	 either	 limited	
corruption	 or	 was	 a	 mechanism	 designed	 by	 external	 funders	 to	 help	 curb	
corruption	through	stronger	accountability	mechanisms.	The	third	rationale	was	
that	PBF	was	a	mechanism	to	increase	value	for	money	and	limit	waste.	Fourth,	
members	 of	 GFATM	 Secretariat	 stressed	 their	 belief	 that	 PBF	 is	 about	 being	
accountable	 to	 those	most	 in	 need	 by	 only	 funding	 projects	 that	 “impacted	 on	
peoples	well‐being	in	measurable	and	meaningful	ways”	(GEN1,	Sept.	2013).	
	
However,	 these	 views	 were	 not	 always	 collectively	 shared	 by	 country	
representatives	 in	 Geneva	 or	 by	 respondents	 within	 the	 case	 countries	
themselves,	who	often	suggested	that	accountability	was	hierarchical	at	GFATM	
with	priority	given	to	the	demands	of	the	funders	(GEN2,	Sept.	2013;	TNZ1,	Nov.	
2012;	ZAM1,	 Jun.	2013;	TNZ2,	Oct.	 2012;	 SA2,	 Sept.	 2013;	 SA1,	 Sept.	 2013).	 In	
relation	 to	 the	World	Bank,	 one	national	health	mission	 to	 the	UN	argued	 that	
PBF	 is	 an	 external	 funder‐led	 initiative	 to	 ‘conditionalize’	 funding	 and	 that	 “it	
might	not	be	in	the	best	interests	of	African	states”	because	these	conditions	are	
“something	all	applications	must	conform	to	regardless	of	whether	it	is	right	for	
that	particular	applicant”	(GEN2,	Sept.	2013;	Barnes	et	al.,	2015).		
	
In	this	regard,	the	rationale	for	PBF	in	global	health	policy	was	not	always	clear	
and	questions	remain	as	to	why	it	has	become	the	‘only	game	in	town’	for	health	
diplomacy.	 In	particular,	 respondents	 from	 the	WHO	stressed	 that	 there	was	a	
general	lack	of	debate	about	PBF	and	that	it	was	often	assumed	or	accepted	that	
it	 was	 the	 most	 effective	 mechanism	 (GEN6,	 Sept.	 2013).	 This	 belief	 in	 the	
effectiveness	of	PBF	was	widely	held	despite	an	inability	by	many	respondents	to	
cite	concrete	evidence.	At	best,	respondents	were	able	to	point	to	a	small	number	
JOURNAL	OF	HEALTH	DIPLOMACY,	1(3)																																											BARNES,	BROWN	AND	HARMAN 
	
	
8
8
of	particular	cases	where	PBF	had	been	seen	to	be	effective,	such	as	in	Rwanda	
and	Burundi,	 but	 the	direct	 evidence	 for	 such	 claims	was	often	admitted	 to	be	
based	more	 on	 “everyday	 conversations	 and	not	 from	any	 report	 or	 evidence”	
(GEN3,	Sept.	2013).	
	
In	 terms	 of	 how	 the	 preferred	 status	 of	 PBF	 affects	 the	diagnostic	quality	 of	 a	
negotiated	agreement,	the	evidence	suggests	that	the	way	PBF	is	structuralized		
by	 the	 World	 Bank	 and	 GFATM	 closes	 off	 other	 potentially	 more	 suitable	
modalities	for	delivering	funding.	In	other	words,	the	intellectual	space	available	
to	conceive	of	alternative	models	for	finance	negotiation	is	restricted	within	the	
diagnostic	phase	due	 to	 the	dominance	of	PBF	and	 the	pressure	 to	accept	 it	as	
the	only	topic	for	health	negotiations.	As	one	WHO	representative	stated,		
	
“I	don’t	think	there	is	a	great	deal	of	argument	taking	place	about	the	risks	
of	 these	 types	 of	 funding	 mechanisms	 …	 on	 the	 whole	 donors	 and	
consultants	 are	 in	 favour	 of	 target‐driven	 financing	 and	 they	 have	
successfully	entrenched	this	as	the	primary	mode	of	operation”	(GEN4,	Sept.	
2013).	
	
	Another	senior	African	representative	to	the	WHO	further	indicated	that,	
	
“there	is	not	much	scope	for	discussing	funding	modalities	…	I	mean	it	does	
come	up,	but	more	in	terms	of	the	system	needing	targeted	aid,	and	more	of	
it.	We	largely	discuss	policy	in	terms	of	priorities,	strategy	and	practice,	not	
on	the	details	of	aid	delivery”	(GEN5,	Sept.	2013).		
	
A	number	of	interviewees	expressed	a	level	of	frustration	that	PBF	was	not	being	
‘properly’	and	‘fully	debated’	at	the	WHO	or	with	funding	institutions	themselves	
because	of	its	‘unquestioned	status’	(GEN2,	Sept.	2013;	GEN4,	Sept.	2013;	GEN6,	
Sept.	 2013).	 What	 this	 suggests,	 is	 that	 within	 global	 health	 diplomacy,	 the	
diagnostic	 phase	 of	 the	 PBF	 negotiation	 process	 is	 essentially	 fixed,	 with	
negotiations	mainly	taking	place	about	how	to	get	funding	or	to	implement	PBF	
in	Africa,	 and	not	 about	 the	overall	 appropriateness	 of	PBF	as	 a	health	 reform	
tool	itself.				
	
Formula	Phase		
The	 case	 evidence	 suggests	 that	 there	 is	 broad	 accord	 between	 negotiating	
parties	 (funders,	 national/principal	 recipients)	 about	 the	 normative	 principles	
that	should	ideally	underwrite	PBF	procedures	and	that	these	principles	should	
act	 as	 foundational	 aims	 for	 negotiated	 agreement.	 For	 example:	 1)	 there	 is	
unified	 recognition	 that	 PBF	 agreements	 should	 reflect	 the	 2005	 Paris	
Declaration	 on	 Aid	 Effectiveness	 (PDAE,	 2005),	 which	 stresses	 national	
ownership,	 alignment,	 harmonization,	 managing	 for	 results	 and	 mutual	
accountability;	2)	there	is	unanimous	stakeholder	commitment	to	both	the	2008	
Accra	Agenda	for	Action	 (AAA,	 2008)	 as	well	 as	MDG	Goal	 Eight,	 stressing	 that	
health	 diplomacy	 should	 represent	 the	 building	 of	 ‘partnerships	 for	
development’;	 3)	 there	 was	 stated	 stakeholder	 agreement	 that	 mutual	
accountability	was	required	and	that	the	quality	of	health	partnership	should	in	
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some	way	represent	an	equitable	distribution	of	obligatory	benefits	and	burdens	
across	all	parties.	As	a	result,	in	relation	to	the	ideal	aims	of	negotiation,	there	is	
general	 understanding	 between	 stakeholders	 regarding	what	 PBF	 negotiations	
should	aim	to	capture	as	well	as	recognition	of	the	MDGs	as	goals	from	which	the	
success	of	health	diplomacy	should	be	ultimately	 judged.	This	meta‐theoretical	
understanding	resonates	with	the	previously	outlined	criteria	deemed	necessary	
for	 fostering	 ‘mutually	 consistent’	 negotiations	 (Raffia,	 2007;	 Starkey	 et	 al.,	
2010)	 and	 the	 basic	 diplomatic	 negotiating	 conditions	 required	 to	 satisfy	 the	
long‐term	 aims	 of	 GHD	 (Berridge,	 2005).	 However,	 despite	 a	 basic	 meta‐
theoretical	understanding	regarding	what	the	procedures	and	outcomes	of	PBF	
should	normatively	resemble,	as	will	be	illustrated	below,	the	current	practice	of	
PBF	negotiations	exhibit	 inherent	asymmetric	 tensions	 in	 its	perceived	quality,	
which	suggests	a	sizeable	distance	between	theory	and	practice.		
	
Negotiation	Phase(s)		
The	research	findings	revealed	three	general	sublevels	for	negotiation	within	the	
bilateral	negotiation	phase	of	the	PBF	diplomacy	process.	These	sublevels	related	
to:	 1)	 negotiations	 to	 set	 performance‐based	 targets;	 2)	 the	 final	 terms	 of	
negotiated	 agreements	 and	 contracts;	 and	 3)	 ongoing	 negotiations	 associated	
with	the	monitoring,	evaluation	and	arbitration	of	performance	satisfaction.	
	
Negotiating	targets	
When	asked	about	the	sense	of	partnership	and	national	ownership	with	GFATM	
and	the	World	Bank,	several	interview	respondents	revealed	that	although	most	
targets	 were	 ‘owned’	 and	 negotiated,	 the	 actions	 of	 both	 funders	 steered	
negotiations	 in	particular	ways	 (albeit	by	different	means	as	discussed	below).	
GFATM,	for	example,	was	regarded	as	forcing	‘conditional	compliances’	that	are	
not	nationally	owned.	Thus,	although	most	interviewees	across	all	cases	felt	that	
national	 governments	 can	 set	 health	 targets,	 there	was	widespread	 agreement	
that	 there	was	 almost	 no	 ability	 to	 set	 ‘conditional	 targets’	 such	 as	 accounting	
mechanisms,	 evaluation	 tools	 or	 reporting	 schemes.	 In	 addition,	 nearly	 all	
recipients	suggested	that	GFATM	is	inflexible	in	this	regard,	and	there	is	constant	
external	 demand	 to	 change	existing	 governance	 systems	 to	meet	 exact	GFATM	
procedures	(Barnes	et	al.,	2015).	As	a	negative	example	in	South	Africa,	GFATM	
required	certain	procedures	for	archiving	records,	yet	this	went	against	national	
privacy	 protection	 laws.	 When	 asked	 about	 what	 this	 means	 in	 terms	 of	
equitable	 GHD,	 one	 top	 health	 official	 suggested,	 “this	makes	 us	 question	 how	
mutual	 the	partnership	 is,	 since	 the	GFATM	would	not	budge	on	 this	condition	
despite	the	fact	that	it	would	violate	domestic	law”	(SA2,	Feb.	2013).	
	
Some	of	those	interviewed	across	all	case	studies	suggested	that	in	developing	a	
contract	and	setting	targets	and	indicators	within	PBF	schemes,	the	World	Bank	
had	effectively	steered	many	of	 the	 types	of	 targets	within	 their	PBF	programs	
through	 dialogue.	 As	 one	 Tanzanian	 official	 claimed,	 “The	 World	 Bank	 had	 a	
number	of	key	interventions	that	they	wanted	to	see	implemented	and	they	were	
very	 firm	 in	 their	 demands”	 (GEN5,	 Sept.	 2013;	 TNZ3,	 Nov.	 2014).	 In	 the	
Zambian	case,	many	interviewees	believed	that	the	World	Bank	pushed	Zambia	
to	 run	 a	pilot	 program	because	 they	 required	more	 test	 trials	 to	 support	 their	
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PBF	evidence	agenda	(GEN3,	Sept.	2014;	ZAM2,	Nov.	2014;	Barnes	et	al.,	2015).	
In	setting	final	targets,	most	interviewees	related	that	the	Zambian	government	
was	able	to	push	its	own	agenda,	but	that	“the	World	Bank	certainly	had	its	own	
ideas”	which	had	to	be	 incorporated	 into	the	 final	PBF	agreement	and	were,	 to	
some	 extent,	 non‐negotiable,	 since	 the	 conditions	 were	 attached	 to	 the	
possibility	 of	 receiving	 much	 needed	 funding	 (GEN3,	 Sept.	 2013).	 As	 a	 result,	
interviewees	 revealed	 a	 high	 level	 of	 frustration	 at	 cumbersome	 or	 dogmatic	
conditionalities	 set	 by	 the	World	 Bank	 and	 GFATM.	 According	 to	 one	 country	
representative	in	Geneva,	
		
“this	 is	 not	 partnership	 and	 although	 PBF	 is	 good,	 it	 can’t	 be	 rolled	 out	
exactly	 the	 same	way	 everywhere	 and	 better	 distinctions	 of	 capacity	 and	
localized	strengths	and	weaknesses	need	to	be	made”		(GEN2,	Sept.	2013).		
	
Although	 there	 was	 evidence	 of	 recipients	 having	 the	 ability	 to	 pursue	 and	
secure	 particular	 interests	 during	 PBF	 contractual	 negotiations,	 the	 scope	 for	
negotiated	 ‘push	back’	was	different	 in	 the	 case	 of	 South	Africa.	 In	 both	 South	
Africa	and	Geneva,	 interviewees	suggested	what	appears	to	be	a	greater	ability	
for	 South	 Africa	 to	 resist	 the	 demands	 of	 external	 funders	 during	 initial	
negotiations	 about	 PBF	 agreements,	 targets	 and	 indicators.	 The	 reasoning	 for	
this	ability	to	push	back	was	reportedly	linked	to	South	Africa	having	a	stronger	
economy	and	less	reliance	on	external	funds	(SA1,	Feb.	2013;	GEN2,	Sept.	2013;	
Barnes	et	al.,	2015).	From	this	it	was	implied	that	the	percentage	of	total	health	
budget	 reliance	 on	 external	 funders	 (South	 Africa	 2.1%,	 Tanzania	 40.2%	 and	
Zambia	 27.8%)	 influences	 the	 scope	 of	 effective	 push	 back	 and	 the	 ability	 to	
resist	 asymmetrical	 conditions	 during	 PBF	 negotiations.	 Nevertheless,	 South	
African	 recipients	 generally	 felt	 that	 external	 funders	 involved	 in	 the	 GFATM	
process	did	attempt	to	steer	deliberations	toward	certain	target	areas	or	target	
outcomes	in	line	with	particular	donor	interests.	Several	interviewees	suggested	
that	 GFATM	 would	 make	 strong	 hints	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 type	 of	 outputs	 that	
would	 be	 “more	 likely	 to	 be	 approved	 by	 the	 Technical	 Review	 Panel”	 and	 to	
firmly	suggest	what	sorts	of	target	deliveries	would	be	deemed	successful.	In	its	
most	cynical	 form,	one	national	health	representative	went	so	far	as	to	suggest	
“that	PBF	is	not	a	partnership	or	representative	of	‘national	ownership’”	(GEN2,	
Sept.	 2013;	 SA2,	 Feb.	 2013).	 As	 this	 interviewee	 suggested,	 PBF	 targets	 and	
mechanisms	might	be	fairly	negotiated	in	some	cases,	but	that	in	southern	Africa,	
and	 indeed	 elsewhere,	 funders	 often	 dictated	 the	 parameters	 for	 possible	
agreement	 in	 advance,	 closed	 off	 areas	 as	 non‐negotiable,	 and	 “expect[ed]	 the	
applicant	to	do	as	they	are	told”	(GEN2,	Sept.	2013).	Although	at	this	point	only	
speculative,	 our	 evidence	 does	 raise	 questions	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	
budgetary	 reliance	 and	 negotiated	 PBF	 outcomes	 and	 to	 what	 degree	 less	
reliance	 on	 external	 funding	 increases	 the	 possibility	 for	 more	 mutually	
consistent	outcomes.	
	
Codifying	agreement		
One	particular	 finding	that	cut	across	all	case	studies	was	 that	 the	World	Bank	
and	GFATM	often	changed	or	amended	targets	at	 the	 last	minute	or	during	the	
implementation	 phase	 (Barnes	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 These	 alterations	 could	 take	 the	
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form	 of	 line	 items	 being	 struck	 from	 a	 grant	 document	 just	 before	
implementation	or	could	take	the	form	of	requests	to	add	certain	provisions	to	
official	documentation	as	the	PBF	projects	were	scaling	up.	For	example,	in	South	
Africa,	 a	 member	 of	 UNAIDS	 who	 has	 worked	 with	 many	 recipients	 in	 Africa	
argued	that	GFATM	often	“changed	the	goal	posts	and	as	a	result	lost	the	trust	of	
many	 partners”	 (SA3,	 Feb.	 2013).	 In	 addition,	 several	 private	 sector	 actors	
suggested	 that	 “the	 private	 sector	 dislikes	 uncertainty,	 especially	 when	
investment	 is	 involved”	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 GFATM	 continued	 last	 minute	
alterations	was	threatening	future	public‐private	partnerships	(SA4,	Feb.	2013).	
In	 Tanzania,	 officials	 suggested	 that	 having	 to	 accept	 last	minute	 changes	was	
part	and	parcel	of	the	funding	relationship,	claiming	that		
	
“we	are	the	ones	that	want	the	money,	they	always	have	the	upper	hand…	
okay	 they	 bring	 that	 one	 there,	 you	 read	 through	 it,	 it	 has	 all	 the	
conditions…	we	end	up	saying	okay”	(TNZ1,	Nov.	2012).		
	
Another	Tanzanian	described	this	relationship	as	“nobody	wants	to	shout	at	the	
paymaster”	 (TNZ2,	 Oct.	 2012),	 which	 was	 mirrored	 in	 Zambia,	 where	 one	
ministry	official	suggested	that	you	do	what	the	funders	want	“because	they	are	
the	ones	who	hold	the	purse	strings”	(ZAM1,	June	2013).	
	
The	 stated	 problem	 with	 such	 alterations	 was	 that	 they	 were	 seen	 as	
unidirectional,	 where	 the	 external	 funders	 could	 make	 requests	 as	 conditions	
changed,	but	that	recipients	were	not	able	to	amend	project	targets	easily	as	new	
information	 became	 available	 or	 as	 conditions	 on	 the	 ground	 changed.	 As	 a	
result,	 many	 interviewees	 questioned	 the	 quality	 of	 and	 scope	 for	 negotiated	
arbitration	 in	 relation	 to	 building	 trust	 and	 clear	 communication	 processes,	
claiming,	“although	we	are	participating	in	discussions,	the	effectiveness	of	those	
discussions	is	often	not	equally	distributed”	(SA2,	Feb.	2013).	
	
Monitoring,	evaluating	and	arbitrating	negotiated	agreement	
The	 research	 revealed	 a	 further	 concern	 with	 the	 monitoring,	 evaluation	 and	
arbitration	 of	 PBF,	 especially	 as	 it	 related	 to	 the	 ability	 of	 African	 actors	 to	
negotiate	a	mutually	consistent	outcome	in	the	 face	of	changing	circumstances.	
As	Spector	and	Zartman	note	(2003),	effective	agreement	requires	the	ability	to	
monitor	and	arbitrate	the	conditions	of	an	agreement	and	to	ratify	agreements	in	
light	of	new	evidence.	Furthermore,	the	criteria	for	understanding	the	quality	of	
negotiation	 and	 increased	 GHD	 outcomes	 requires	 trust	 building	 through	
effective	 communication	 channels,	 multidirectional	 decision‐making	 processes,	
reason‐giving,	perceptions	of	win‐win	outcomes	and	mutual	agreement	 (Raiffa,	
2007;	 Starkey	 et	 al.,	 2010;	 Berridge,	 2005;	 Lister	 &	 Lee,	 2013).	 Yet,	 PBF	
processes	 were	 far	 from	 straightforward	 in	 this	 regard	 and	 revealed	 a	 clear	
asymmetry	 and	 hierarchy	 in	 negotiating	 position,	 particularly	 in	 Tanzania	 and	
Zambia.	First,	external	funders	often	requested	African	actors	to	alter	reporting	
systems,	 sometimes	 without	 sufficient	 warning	 or	 detailed	 explanation.	 For	
example,	 the	 Payment	 for	 Performance	 (P4P)	 project	 in	 Tanzania	 was	
accompanied	last	minute	by	a	further	demand	by	the	World	Bank	for	additional	
indicators	to	be	incorporated	into	their	Health	Management	Information	System	
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to	meet	Bank	standards	(Barnes	et	al.,	2015).	Second,	 it	was	commonly	related	
that	 funder	 reporting	 schemes	 could	 be	 changed	 mid‐project	 with	 little	
consideration	 of	 the	 ramp‐up	 time	 needed.	 According	 to	 different	 high‐level	
officials	 in	 South	 Africa,	 “the	 Fund	 continues	 to	 change	 the	 conditional	
regulations,	but	not	always	with	sufficient	warning”	(SA2,	Feb.	2013).	This	ability	
to	change	reporting	systems	without	additional	negotiation	or	consultation	was	
not	 only	 seen	 by	 many	 African	 actors	 as	 undermining	 effective	 program	
implementation,	but	also	as	an	unfair	ability	to	dictate	non‐negotiable	terms.		
	
Like	 monitoring	 above,	 the	 evaluation	 of	 performance	 is	 a	 key	 aspect	 of	 PBF	
agreements	 and,	 in	 theory,	 there	 should	 be	 entry	points	 for	different	 actors	 to	
negotiate	outcomes.	In	practice,	however,	evaluation	was	also	seen	as	a	point	for	
closing	down	negotiations,	given	that	any	sign	of	non‐performance	could	result	
in	 grant/loan	 termination.	 Furthermore,	 given	 that	 PBF	 tends	 to	 involve	 the	
changing	 of	 goalposts	 after	 contracts/project	 agreements	 have	 been	 signed,	
actors	 often	 found	 it	 difficult	 to	 understand	 what	 constitutes	 adequate	
performance	and,	therefore,	any	delay	by	extending	negotiations	was	deemed	as	
a	 disproportionate	 risk	 to	 recipients	 (Barnes	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 For	 example,	 this	
sense	of	uncertainty	and	risk	associated	with	PBF	was	reported	throughout	the	
Zambian	case	and	at	all	levels;	with	health	workers	suggesting	uncertainty	about	
what	 performance	meant	 and	what	 avenues	 existed	 for	 additional	 discussions	
when	discrepancies	occurred	within	the	evaluation	process	(Barnes	et	al.,	2015).	
Lastly,	 nearly	 all	 interviewees	 held	 the	 belief	 that	 there	 was	 “zero	 flexibility	
when	 it	 comes	 to	 meeting	 targets”	 and	 that	 additional	 room	 for	 negotiation	
regarding	performance	evaluation	was	often	closed	off	by	both	the	World	Bank	
and	 GFATM	 (SA6,	 Feb.	 2013;	 Barnes	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 A	 further	 lack	 of	 GFATM	
flexibility	in	the	face	of	external	circumstances	beyond	the	control	of	recipients	
was	also	illustrated.	As	one	UNAIDS	official	remarked,		
	
“There	 is	 no	 flexibility	 in	 regards	 to	 external	 circumstances.	 This	 is	
particularly	 problematic	 in	 cases	 of	 extreme	 currency	 fluctuations	where	
funds	can	be	reduced	by	20%	within	a	quick	period	of	time	leaving	principal	
recipients	underfunded,	yet	responsible	 to	deliver	 the	same	 targets	agreed	
to	prior	to	the	economy	tanking”	(SA3,	Feb.	2013).	
	
Lastly,	another	common	theme	across	the	three	case	studies	related	to	a	general	
understanding	that	current	GFATM	auditing	systems	did	not	allow	for	additional	
negotiations	 and	 that	 the	 structure	was	 unidirectional	 and	 thus	 antithetical	 to	
notions	 of	 mutually	 consistent	 settlement	 as	 defined	 by	 Raiffa	 (2007)	 and	
Starkey	 et	 al.,	 (2010).	 Respondents	 held	 this	 view	 because	 there	 was	 often	
limited	 reason‐giving	or	 feedback	process,	 no	 ability	 to	 see	 accounting	 reports	
and	 limited	 ability	 to	 discuss	 the	 reports	 with	 the	 auditing	 Local	 Fund	 Agent	
(LFA).	As	one	former	LFA	auditor	himself	said,		
	
“There	was	absolutely	no	dialogue	between	the	recipient	and	the	LFA.	The	
reporting	system	is	not	transparent	on	the	LFA	side…	the	LFA	is	reluctant	to	
provide	support	during	the	report	write‐up	phase.	Each	report	takes	about	
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1.5	months	 to	assemble	and	 there	 is	no	partnership	 in	 this	process”	 (SA5,	
Feb.	2013).		
	
More	 broadly	 across	 the	 three	 case	 studies,	 African	 actors	 often	 stated	 an	
uncertainty	 about	 how	 to	 take	 arbitration	 cases	 forward,	 the	 procedures	
involved	 or	 what	 legal	 jurisdiction	 or	 laws	 applied	 (Barnes	 et	 al.,	 2015).	 This	
suggests,	along	with	 the	aforementioned	 issues,	 that	 the	quality	of	negotiations	
within	 PBF	 schemes	 remains	 wanting,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 more	
normative	understandings	of	global	health	diplomacy	as	a	potential	mechanism	
to	coordinate	mutually	consistent	and	agreed	health	policies	that	will	“ultimately	
improve	and	save	lives”	by	improving	long‐term	diplomatic	relations	(Marten	et	
al.,	2014).		
	
Conclusion	
African	 actors	 within	 national	 governments	 generally	 set	 and	 negotiate	
performance	 targets	 of	 PBF	 schemes,	 yet	 the	 quality	 of	 PBF	 negotiations	with	
external	 funders	 remains	 inconsistent	 in	 practice,	 suggesting	 the	 existence	 of	
asymmetrical	 power	 and	 influence	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 those	
negotiations.	This	raises	questions	about	the	level	of	power	and	influence	being	
exerted	by	external	funders	and	how	much	negotiation	leverage	African	political	
actors	 have	 available	 to	 them	 within	 global	 health	 diplomacy.	 African	
negotiations	are	often	stymied	at	various	phases	of	the	PBF	negotiation	process,	
and	evidence	suggests	that	the	financial	mechanisms	offered	by	external	funders	
steer	 and	 limit	 the	 quality	 of	 these	 negotiations	 themselves.	 This	 is	 largely	
because	 certain	 aspects	 of	 PBF	 are	 often	 closed	 off	 and	 restricted	 from	
negotiation,	which	 is	 institutionalized	 at	 each	 phase	 of	 Zartman	 and	 Berman’s	
negotiated	agreement	model	 (1982).	 These	 closures	 come	 in	 the	 form	 of	 PBF	
ideational	dominance	that	closes	out	finance	alternatives.	This	comes	in	the	form	
of	non‐negotiable	grant/loan	conditionalities	that	set	limits	to	the	types	of	health	
interventions	 or	 targets	 available	 for	 negotiation.	 In	 addition,	 it	 includes	 non‐
negotiable	 reporting,	 evaluation	 and	 arbitration	 mechanisms	 that	 inherently	
restrict	 further	 abilities	 to	 negotiate	 agreement	 alterations	 in	 the	 face	 of	
changing	 conditions	 on	 the	 ground.	 African	 actors	 could	 of	 course	 seek	 to	
challenge	 these	 restrictions	 more	 overtly,	 yet	 this	 would	 risk	 conflict	 and	 the	
subsequent	closing	down	of	access	to	health	systems	funding.	If	we	are	to	judge	
the	 quality	 of	 African	 health	 diplomacy	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 quality	 of	 PBF	
negotiations	within	 global	 health	 policy,	 then	 PBF,	 as	 it	 is	 currently	 practiced,	
exhibits	 asymmetrical	 power	 and	 influence	 by	 funders	 that	 greatly	 affect	
diplomatic	relations	and	the	future	success	of	GHD.	
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